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Summary box
 ► Digital health data provide both opportunities for 
benefit and risks for vulnerable populations. We pro-
pose a data governance framework that can both 
reduce the risk of digital health data misuse while 
promoting increased access for potential benefit.
 ► Our primary aim is to provide a framework that will 
assist stakeholders to understand the key elements 
required for good data governance within digital 
health systems.
 ► We present four key domains within this framework, 
namely (1) ethical oversight and informed consent 
processes, (2) data protection through data access 
controls, (3) sustainability of ethical data use and (4) 
application of the relevant legislation.
AbSTrACT
Globally, the volume of private and personal digital data 
has massively increased, accompanied by rapid expansion 
in the generation and use of digital health data. These 
technological advances promise increased opportunity 
for data-driven and evidence-based health programme 
design, management and assessment; but also increased 
risk to individuals of data misuse or data breach of their 
sensitive personal data, especially given how easily 
digital data can be accessed, copied and transferred on 
electronic platforms if the appropriate controls are not 
implemented. This is particularly pertinent in low-income 
and middle-income countries (LMICs), where vulnerable 
populations are more likely to be at a disadvantage in 
negotiating digital privacy and confidentiality given the 
intersectional nature of the digital divide. The potential 
benefits of strengthening health systems and improving 
health outcomes through the digital health environment 
thus come with a concomitant need to implement strong 
data governance structures and ensure the ethical use 
and reuse of individuals’ data collected through digital 
health programmes. We present a framework for data 
governance to reduce the risks of health data breach or 
misuse in digital health programmes in LMICS. We define 
and describe four key domains for data governance and 
appropriate data stewardship, covering ethical oversight 
and informed consent processes, data protection through 
data access controls, sustainability of ethical data 
use and application of relevant legislation. We discuss 
key components of each domain with a focus on their 
relevance to vulnerable populations in LMICs and examples 
of data governance issues arising within the LMIC context.
InTroduCTIon
Individuals commit a growing proportion 
of their personal and private data to digital 
devices during routine use; and simultane-
ously, technological advances for saving, 
storing, duplicating and transferring digital 
data mean that replicating and sharing data-
sets has become much easier to facilitate. 
Health systems can leverage these data and 
bring evidence-based depth to intervention 
design, programme management and perfor-
mance assessment. This has led to a rapid 
expansion of technology use in the health 
sector to both generate and share large, gran-
ular and informative data. These advances 
in digital approaches to data open avenues 
for rethinking how we handle data across 
health systems levels to advance the health 
of vulnerable populations in low-income and 
middle-income countries (LMICs).
Near ubiquitous access to mobile phones 
has raised the profile of mobile phones as 
tools for improving patient-provider commu-
nication, access to health services and infor-
mation and data collection (reviewed in Ref. 
1). Rapid implementation of mobile and 
digital tools in the health sector, however, 
has triggered concerns. The digital health 
ecosystem is particularly vulnerable to data 
misuse because it combines extremely sensi-
tive health data with digital platforms that are 
well suited to replication and dissemination 
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box 1 A checklist for implementing digital data 
governance principles
Ethics and informed consent
 ► Vulnerable populations are identified and appropriate resources as-
signed for protection of their data.
 ► Tiered consent process is clearly delineated and each level of con-
sent is stored.
 ► Patient information describes in detail intended data use, storage 
and future destruction.




 ► Put in place clear procedures for processing data access requests 
which include oversight by key stakeholders.
 ► Define protocols to guard against data commodification.
 ► Articulate important metrics for assessing access requests, which 
may include:
 – Geographic locations of data requestor and requested data.
 – Fair representation of all stakeholders with sensitivity to postco-
lonial inequities and appropriation.
 – Providing minimum data to service requests without unneces-
sary exposure of sensitive data.
 – Maximising permissible benefit from appropriate data use.
 ► Avoid person-centric gatekeeping around data and establish com-
mittees, standard procedures and guidelines for data use together 
with government stakeholders.
Structural controls
 ► Install appropriate remote-delete software on devices in case of 
loss or theft.
 ► Restrict app installations and personal use on devices used to col-
lect participant data.
 ► Separately store and transport identifying and sensitive/clinical 
data.
 ► Store data in secure, firewall-controlled and access-controlled 
locations.
 ► Where possible work within secure digital environments used by 
local health departments.
Sustainability
 ► Build an interoperable data structure so that data can be easily 
shared where appropriate.
 ► Provide up-to-date documentation, consent information and code-
books for all datasets.
 ► Establish a data backup plan for frequent back up to secure 
locations.
 ► Implement a long-term data storage and management plan that is 
not dependent on particular individuals or organisations.
Legal Framework
 ► Familiarity with relevant sections of all local/regional legislation 
pertaining to Healthcare, Protection of Privacy, Access to Personal 
Information Acts.
 ► Identify the entity responsible for the data and key stakeholders, in 
collaboration with government structures.
 ► Facilitate review by local regulators where necessary.
 ► Comply with restrictions on moving data across borders, including 
identifying related issues with Cloud storage.
of datasets. With an online personal computer or mobile 
device it is possible to copy and disseminate huge data-
sets almost instantaneously, which increases the risks 
of inappropriate data sharing, and makes it harder to 
contain or reverse data breaches: the stakes are much 
higher for digital datasets because once shared, it is 
almost impossible to track down or delete copies of those 
data. This is further exacerbated by the complexity of 
the data flow involving multiple channels with a range of 
stakeholders and points of exposure—from individuals 
to data consumers, via data collectors; through mobile 
devices, interoperability layers and intermediate data-
bases; and to databases where the data are permanently 
held.2 Finally, the potential for unconsented commodi-
fication of collected data, whereby individuals cannot 
control or access how their data are being shared, reused 
or commercialised, poses a significant risk. Collectively 
these risks are particularly heightened in low-resource 
settings marked by deep intersectional inequalities, and 
where governments are lagging behind in implementing 
data protection policies and regulatory oversight to 
ensure protection of personal information.
Given emerging opportunities and risks in digital data 
use, here we propose a data governance framework to 
reduce risks of data misuse while promoting increased 
access for potential benefit, in the context of expanding 
scope, depth and coverage of data-driven digital health 
interventions. We present four key domains in which 
data governance structures can be articulated and imple-
mented to ensure appropriate data stewardship: (1) 
ethical oversight and informed consent processes, (2) 
data protection through data access controls, (4) sustain-
ability of ethical data use and (4) application of relevant 
legislation.
Our primary aim is to provide an overview that will 
assist stakeholders to understand the key elements 
required for good data governance within digital health 
systems (summarised in box 1), so as to ensure maximal 
benefit while meeting universal ethical standards. This 
framework is derived from our own experiences working 
with digital health data in South Africa and India, and is 
intended to provide a practical framework to assist others 
similarly developing their own data governance struc-
tures. We also highlight key elements from legislation on 
data protection that are relevant to health programmes. 
We illustrate our framework with examples drawn from 
LMICs, and our experience working in programmes in 
South Africa and India, but we believe that the principles 
are universal.
KEy TEnETS For dATA govErnAnCE
Figure 1 presents the four main pillars of digital data 
governance that we believe are critical to ensure health 
benefit and participant protection for vulnerable popu-
lations in LMICs. We provide further detail for key 
elements that fall within each of these domains.
Ethics and informed consent
Below, we discuss key elements of ethics considerations 
for participant protection, with a focus on how these 
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Figure 1 Pillars of digital data governance to ensure protection of individuals.
elements may impact the use of digital health data from 
vulnerable populations. We recognise the importance 
of community engagement and public involvement in 
informing these ethics considerations prior to embarking 
on the collection of digital health data.
Vulnerable populations
As part of participant protection, vulnerable populations 
must be identified and special care taken when requesting 
data from these participants. In LMICs, the likelihood of 
participants having some level of vulnerability is high, and 
this is exacerbated in areas of conflict and humanitarian 
crisis.3 While digital technologies can increase access to 
key populations, where participation takes place through 
digital platforms without a human interface there is an 
added layer of difficulty to ensuring appropriate protec-
tion and ethical engagement with vulnerable individuals. 
In contexts where a human interface is available, the 
nature of that interaction coupled with the characteris-
tics of the individuals involved—including their educa-
tion, language, the presence of power differentials and 
other factors—may drive participation and engagement, 
including perceptions on whether it is compulsory. In 
the context of South Africa’s national mobile maternal 
messaging programme ‘MomConnect’, while current 
registration processes via healthcare providers during 
antenatal care clinics provide an opportunity to obtain 
informed consent and for providers to answer partici-
pant questions, it too raises important questions about 
whether participants can decline participation and what 
(if any) the consequences might be on the quality of care 
received and/or future health systems contacts.
Potential harms
While potential harms in the field, for example in a clin-
ical trial, might be tangible and physical, potential harms 
through the use of personal and health data can be 
harder to predict. Health data breaches can lead to stig-
matisation of individuals or a demographic group,4 and 
unconsented secondary use of personal data may also 
lead to privacy infractions through unsolicited contact or 
content—which may have unintended consequences. For 
example, phone numbers are collected through public 
sector Maternal Child Tracking System and Reproductive 
Child Health registers in India and may be used for the 
passive enrolment of women into mobile health infor-
mation campaigns. Delivery of these messages, including 
those pertaining to family planning, on shared phones 
may result in family misunderstandings and conflict.5
Understanding the representativeness of the popu-
lation for whom digital data are being collected is vital 
in ensuring its responsible use. Harm can unintention-
ally occur when data drawn through digital means are 
assumed to be generalisable when they are not. Such 
an assumption may further increase inequities in the 
representation of needs and distribution of resources 
by building on existing differentials in access to mobile 
phones and other digital tools, as well as variations 
in digital literacy among those with access to a mobile 
phone and other digital tools.
Importantly, it is not always possible to predict future 
risks to individuals or communities within the limits of 
current knowledge. For example, the concept of one’s 
own data privacy choices inherently implicating others is 
gaining traction through recent high profile use of online 
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genomic data resources to identify relatedness.6 The 
increasing ubiquity of mobile phones and tablets in the 
hands of frontline healthcare providers increases risk of 
health data exposure through concurrent personal and 
professional use of devices: household phone sharing, 
theft of the device, or exposure to malware and viruses 
from downloaded applications could lead to unintended 
health data disclosure by the healthcare worker.7
Confidentiality
A key requirement for ethical research is to ensure that 
data from participants remain confidential, and the 
changing data landscape needs to be met with enhanced 
approaches to confidentiality. Paper records might be 
locked in filing cabinets with physical access restrictions, 
but for electronic data the restrictions must be technically 
appropriate to ensure that the confidentiality entrusted 
by participants is upheld. Suitable approaches include 
system administrative and firewall restrictions on who 
can access electronic data resources and encryption of 
drives containing sensitive data. Data de-identification or 
anonymisation has been a standard approach to ensure 
participant confidentiality and reduce risk of disclo-
sures, but re-identification risks increases with as data 
becomes ever more granular.4 Anonymisation is harder 
to ensure—a problem especially well illustrated by efforts 
to de-identify genomic data which are intrinsically and 
ultimately defining of an individual. Even aggregated 
data reporting using combined measurements for groups 
of individuals can result in stigmatisation, ‘othering’ or 
negative stereotyping of demographic groups, and geoc-
oded data can increase this risk through geographical 
localisation, for example, ‘hotspot mapping’ for preva-
lence of infectious pathogens such as HIV or tuberculosis. 
Reviews of community acceptance of data collection in 
LMICs suggest that participants may also doubt the confi-
dentiality of their data collected electronically (reviewed 
in Ref. 8); and the paucity of reports on breaches of 
confidentiality in LMICs suggests that oversight, breach 
detection and reporting are lacking .9 10
Informed consent processes
Key items related to digital data that should be covered 
in the information section for participants undergoing 
informed consent include:
1. The intended data use: by whom and for how long. 
Primary, secondary and general data use should be 
clearly indicated, and separate (tiered) consent ob-
tained for these. This should include details of any 
intended monetised secondary use of or third party 
access to the data.
2. If, and how the data will be anonymised for further 
analysis.
3. How the data will be protected, and when the data will 
be destroyed.
4. Risks and benefits to the participant, including any re-
muneration.
5. Contact information for further questions or concerns 
and/or requests to withdraw from the study, and in-
formation about how data will be deleted at the end 
of the study.
As programmes and legislation expand and evolve over 
time, changes to the content and processes for obtaining 
informed consent may be required; and adjustments 
made. Box 2 illustrates the informed consent process 
for the MomConnect programme in South Africa, high-
lighting how such consent processes may be affected by 
implementation of the Protection of Personal Informa-
tion (POPI) Act in South Africa,11 as well as unanticipated 
ways in which the process of obtaining consent changed 
over time to accommodate programme integration with 
routine health services delivery.12
Beneficence
Assessing beneficence of a programme or study gener-
ating digital data requires an understanding of how the 
participant (or other people) may benefit from those 
data. To be considered ethical, the output must be demon-
strably truly beneficial either to participating individuals, 
or for the common good. Given that a study is sufficiently 
well-designed, the extent of beneficence must be offset 
against—and substantially outweigh—the concomitant 
potential for harm to participants through data breach 
or misuse. Furthermore, the benefits must be equitably 
distributed. Participation in international health systems 
research can be tainted in inequality and surface in post-
colonial research dynamics.13–15 Other concerns include 
benefit of data use for well-resourced populations at 
the cost of those who are under-resourced;16–19 unequal 
distribution of funding for data-generating research20 21 
and silo’d aid programmes that operate in parallel with 
local health systems or fail to return insights or benefits 
from participant data that they collect.21 22
Return of results and secondary findings
Balancing beneficence and risks also encompass 
returning study results or secondary findings from data 
reuse to all stakeholders including field workers, health 
departments, health client populations and study partic-
ipants. Such feedback loops are often overlooked by 
researchers and programme implementing partners 
alike—especially where researchers do not have direct 
interactions with participants because of digital imple-
mentation. There appear to be few frameworks for 
data return. Furthermore the logistical challenges of 
recontacting study participants to share findings can be 
particularly challenging in LMICs. Frameworks for data 
return to individuals should be established at programme 
outset, adequate resources (time and costs) allotted and 
specific consents should be requested from participants: 
not everyone wishes to receive personal data findings, 
and secondary findings can cause distress and discomfit, 
especially when a definitive or actionable result cannot 
be provided.23 24 Decisions must be made about how 
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box 2 Continued
 ► Any additional data use beyond provision of maternal text mes-
sages must be explicitly communicated and consented (this would 
apply for research) at the time of registration. Understanding that 
not all potential uses of data can be anticipated from the outset of 
a programme, consent language may need further refinement as 
additional data use scenarios come arise.
 ► Any intended third party data access must be communicated and 
explicitly consented to by the participant at the time of registration.
 ► Explicit consent must be requested for any future unsolicited 
contact.
 ► A clear process must be communicated to opt out and have records 
deleted at any time, with reassurance that normal standard of care 
will be received and there will be no negative consequences of de-
clining or opting out.
box 2 Implications for MomConnect of legislative change 
and the protection of personal information (PoPI) Act in 
South Africa
Consent procedures
The current MomConnect programme consists of three 
components: (1) pregnancy registration, (2) delivery of health 
information messages and (3) helpdesk. Registration to MomConnect 
occurs during antenatal care in the public sector, where oral consent 
should be taken by a healthcare provider.
 ► Registration fields include a USSD consent message: ‘We need to 
collect, store, and use her. [pregnant woman’s] info. She may get 
messages on public holidays and weekends. Does she consent? 1. 
Yes; 2. No’.
 ► Additional data elements collected as part of registration include 
women’s phone number, expected date of delivery, language pref-
erence, facility code and at least one of the following: date of birth, 
identification type (telephone, national id or passport number) and 
identification issuing authority (country).
unanticipated adaptations
 ► In 2016, over half of registrations occurred on a device other than 
the women’s personal mobile phone, including the healthcare pro-
vider or a facility-based data entry clerk.12
 ► High patient volumes, clinical demands on providers, coupled with 
the lengthy time required to register women to MomConnect over 
USSD has meant that registration often occurs in ‘batch’ on a de-
vice other than the women’s personal mobile phone. In practice, this 
means many of the registration details are captured on paper and 
later input by a designated data entry clerk or provider in the clinic.
 ► This unfortunately means that for half of all women registered, their 
consent cannot be confirmed because these data were not collect-
ed on their personal mobile device.
 ► Qualitative interviews suggest that there are often inaccuracies in 
the data inputted during registration, including user preferences for 
language (A E LeFevre, personal communication).
How might consent procedures be enhanced?
 ► Women are currently consenting to have the data collected during 
registration for undefined purposes. Consent language should be 
modified to more comprehensively capture the intended uses for 
the data and sent to the participant on their own phone.
Suggested language: ‘We need to collect, store and use your in-
formation for sending you text messages containing health infor-
mation about your pregnancy. You may get messages on public 
holidays and weekends. Do you agree for us to use your information 
this way? 1. Yes; 2. No’.
To use data for purposes other than the delivery of health informa-
tion content, further revisions to consent language would need to be 
made to capture anticipated uses.
 ► For individuals registered on a device other than their own, an SMS 
text message is sent separately to them on their own mobile phone 
to obtain consent. Only those responding in the affirmative (and 
thus ‘opting-in’ after registration details are collected) should be 
registered to the programme.
 ► A system must be put into place for registered users to access data 
and update where needed. The procedures for accessing these data 
must be communicated to users and readily available.
 ► Use of data for research purposes must be governed by accepted 
standards for human participants research.
What are some further requirements for PoPI compliance?
 ► The responsible party for the data should be identified to partici-
pants, with contact details in the event of any participant concerns.
Continued
secondary findings will be classified as appropriate for 
return to participants, accordingly.
data access controls
Once data are generated, the responsible party which 
commissioned the collection of the data must ensure that 
they are managed in an appropriate and legal way. Access 
to digital data can be managed at two levels, explained 
below. Procedural controls ensure that documented 
processes are in place to ensure data protection and 
appropriate reuse; and structural controls use informa-
tion technology and infrastructural and technical protec-
tions to guard against data breach.
Procedural oversight for data access
Once a dataset has been generated, it is advisable to 
establish a clearly articulated, unbiased process to apply 
for data access. This may involve submitting a request to a 
formalised Data Access Committee or similar board, who 
should also keep a full recorded history of data access 
granted and datasets disseminated. Standard operating 
procedures for how to access data; and clear, transparent 
documentation of the process should be openly available. 
Some key issues that may be addressed during the review 
of a data access request might include:
The geographic location of the requestor of the dataset and the 
origin of the data
Governments have differing legislation over how data may 
be transferred across borders, and this must be clearly 
articulated in consideration of data access requests; for 
example in South Africa, transfer of identified/identifi-
able health data of South Africans outside the country 
can only be undertaken with specific permission by the 
POPI regulator.11 This includes scenarios where data may 
be requested through cloud storage, where the physical 
location of the cloud server may also need consideration.
Whether the data request submitted is equitable
Data access requests should include a fair representation 
of all partners and be sensitive to postcolonial inequities 
and appropriation.13 14 Some data access committees may 
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require some form of contribution to the data-generating 
site or partnerships that lead to capacity or skills develop-
ment to discourage inequitable or predatory data acqui-
sition. For example, where a health department in an 
LMIC has the skills and resources to undertake effective 
analysis of their own data, a request for the data from an 
academic researcher who has no existing relationship to 
the health department, country or dataset may be recon-
sidered.
Whether the data use requested allows maximal permissible 
benefit to be obtained from the dataset while minimising 
participant risk
The Data Access Committee should also consider the 
ethical use of the generated data,25 balanced with risks 
and beneficence for participants. For example, requested 
access to a large and complex dataset—exposing partic-
ipants to some risk of data breach—to answer a simple 
research question of limited importance or applicability 
might be discouraged.
Structural implementations for data access control
Structural and technological protocols may also be 
employed to protect data. These include software-based 
solutions such as firewalls, encryptions, passwords and 
systems administration to control access to databases 
and datasets stored on servers or computers. Database 
design can also increase protection of participants, for 
example by separating biometric and identifying data in 
a different database to clinically informative data. In this 
way, sensitive data cannot be easily linked to identifying 
data and a separate linkage key is needed to join physi-
cally separated data. Tiered or partial data access can be 
provided as appropriate, and a ‘minimum data’ access 
policy can prescribe that individuals only have access to 
the data that they absolutely require to see.
Additional structural governance items include imple-
mentation of secure back-up and disaster recovery plans, 
with appropriate security for stored copies of data accord-
ingly. Where data must be transferred, well-documented 
data transfer protocols should exist, describing encryp-
tion, password protection, separation of sensitive from 
identifying data for transfer and the use of secure plat-
forms for data transfer rather than email, flash drives or 
other insecure transfer media. A recent literature review 
has shown, for example, the proliferation in LMICs of 
use of the WhatsApp chat application for sharing patient 
information between clinicians—with scant regard for 
security, consent or protection of confidentiality.26 This 
may be fuelled by a lack of accessible, convenient and 
secure internal platforms for efficient and appropriate 
sharing of patient data.
Sustainability
Effective data governance requires a clear, documented 
plan for sustainability, to ensure maximised benefit and 
minimal risks from health systems data into the future. 
This arises from an ethical imperative to ensure that the 
data can be reused where appropriate and where ethics 
are in place, ensuring maximised return for funding—es-
pecially when funded by public and taxpayers’ money 
and also out of respect to participants for the time, effort 
and risk they have endured in order to provide the data. 
A formalised sustainability plan can ensure that outcomes 
are maximised and achievements can be far-reaching and 
sustainable without compromising other processes.
As the use of digital tools has grown throughout the 
last decade, in LMICs they have proliferated in vertical 
and silo’d digital health programmes, competing for 
finite resources, often duplicating prior efforts, and in 
some cases diverting precious resources from core health 
services delivery. In these cases, parallel healthcare 
streams are not integrated with national or governmental 
health resources, and the digital health data they collect 
are not harnessed for strengthening core health systems 
and are at risk of inappropriate reuse. In the digital health 
ecosystem, the expansion of disease or condition specific 
small scale apps and digital health solutions has led to a 
fragmentation of tools designed with limited interoper-
ability or extensibility. Further, in many contexts, design 
and implementation are led by technology companies 
with limited clinical or public health personnel. The lack 
of planning for sustainability, integration into existing 
health information systems and interoperability has led 
to ‘pilotitis’—the proliferation of short lived standalone 
mobile and other digital health tools. In response, some 
governments (eg, Uganda27) have called for morato-
riums on new app deployment within the health system. 
In under-resourced environments in LMICs, health 
systems monitoring or evaluation programmes should 
rather ensure integration with core health services, scal-
ability and a long-term trajectory for the programme.28–31
Sustainability planning requires having systems in 
place to ensure that data stewardship is entrenched 
and is not personality-driven but rather systemic and 
person-agnostic. In the technology sector, turn-over 
of staff can be high which can result in loss of institu-
tional and programme knowledge unless a sustainability 
plan is in place. It requires the data to be consistently, 
clearly and extensively documented, and properly stored 
and backed up. Furthermore, datasets should adhere to 
FAIR principles for datasets by appropriate recording of 
dataset metadata:32 they should be Findable, Accessible, 
Interoperable and Reusable (where ethics approvals 
and informed consent are in place for the data to be 
used further). Adhering to FAIR principles will ensure 
that data can be retrieved, queried and reused into the 
future.32 33 Planning for sustainability requires upfront 
budgeting to ensure that data remain accessible and 
useable for authorised end-users, and sufficient resources 
should be allocated accordingly.
Legal frameworks
Legislation on POPI has been drafted in many countries 
and is continually being reviewed and refined as the 
proclivity for big data increases globally. It is, however, 
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challenging for legislators to predict and anticipate new 
types of potential data misuse; and evolving risks cannot 
always be anticipated as new data types evolve. Concerns 
with recent high profile personal data breaches have 
prompted revision of legislation and oversight in many 
countries. For example, in India concern about substan-
tial data breach of the Aadhaar biometric identification 
system has resulted in revisions of the Healthcare Secu-
rity Act.34–37
Another challenge alongside such iterative refinement 
is that implementing oversight and enforcement are not 
yet commonplace. As a result, legislation tends to be 
reactive to challenges rather than pre-emptive, so data 
generators and consumers need to take the initiative in 
ensuring good data governance within the framework of 
successful, data-driven health systems development and 
implementation.
In South Africa, the POPI Act is currently being 
implemented, with specific legislation detailed for 
health data, which are considered ‘special’ data 
requiring particularly stringent regulations for use 
and reuse.11 Furthermore, the Health Act of South 
Africa38 defines the confidentiality that must be upheld 
between clinician and client, ensuring protection of 
the client’s sensitive data; and the Promotion of Access 
to Information Act (PAIA)39 enshrines the right for 
individuals to be able to access and review data held 
about them: every individual should be able to receive 
a full account of how their data have been used, on 
request. Ensuring compliance with PAIA requires suit-
able logging and storage of data usage, so that this can 
be provided on demand. The European Union has 
recently implemented a progressive legislative frame-
work for protection of personal information,40 which 
may also inform new legislation in other countries. 
Online supplementary table S1 compares examples of 
content areas addressed by legislation in the European 
Union and South Africa, and online supplementary 
table S2 compares and explains some key terminology 
used by both. A more detailed comparison of some key 
sections of the legislation is provided in online supple-
mentary table S2.
ovErSIgHT And EnForCEMEnT
The framework that we have presented here proposes 
oversight of data access through data access committees, 
oversight of ethical compliance by ethics committees 
and compliance with legislation through legal infra-
structure overseen by legislative infrastructure—for 
example, data protection officers mandated by GPDR 
in the European Union.
To ensure the implementation of these components 
of good governance, structures for enforcement are 
also needed. In the context of national health initiatives 
or public health programmes, a Department of Health 
committee may exist which provides broad support to 
implementation, ensuring immediate adherence to 
legislative standards and providing guidance on prac-
tical steps for implementation—for example, in the 
context of the MomConnect Program in South Africa, a 
Department of Health Task Force chaired by the a full-
time senior advisor serves in this capacity, overseeing 
an array of stakeholders including representatives from 
technology, donor and academic institutions. Beyond 
this entity, a national oversight and enforcement regu-
latory body, the POPI Regulator for South Africa has 
been created to accommodate direct-to-consumer 
engagement such as the lodging of complaints and 
adjudication where uncertainty exists around legality of 
data management or use.11 In box 2, we outline some of 
the implications of POPI implementation for MomCon-
nect. To support special requests for data processing, 
additional layers of ethical review may be required.
Increasingly, Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) need 
to become conversant in ethical considerations for 
digital datasets—which in some cases can be generated 
from electronic mobile health records without partici-
pants’ knowledge. Particularly where other legislative 
standards are not in place or are not enforced, IRBs 
are the gatekeepers and the last line of defense for 
protection of participants. Because they play such an 
important role, it is essential that IRB members keep 
abreast of key issues arising in mobile health environ-
ments and that they remain current in their under-
standing of the evolving landscape in digital health.
ConCLuSIon
The rapid proliferation of digital health tools glob-
ally and throughout LMICs offers much promise in 
addressing critical gaps in health systems. While there 
is a clear responsibility for researchers, programme 
managers and staff to ensure good digital data govern-
ance and appropriate, consented digital data use, 
there is also a very important role for governments 
and multinational bodies to define and demand appro-
priate digital data governance checks and balances in 
ongoing programmes. Here, we present a governance 
framework for digital health data in health systems 
research, that presents tenets of data governance at 
the micro level where interactions between individ-
uals enable participant protection through consent 
processes and ethical engagement with personal data; 
at the meso level whereby organisations such as ethics 
review boards, donors and data access committees work 
together to ensure appropriate data use; and at the 
macrolevel whereby legislators and governments define 
how data governance must be undertaken to ensure the 
protection of individuals.
While we have sought to provide a starting point for 
this discussion, the global community would benefit 
from WHO guidance in this area. In the meantime, 
country level efforts are underway to push for greater 
accountability and transparency in the data gover-
nance structures and ethics procedures underpinning 
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digital tools being implemented in the health sector. 
In India, the National Health Systems Resource Centre 
(NHSRC) has established a Community of Research 
and Practice for Digital Health which is developing 
impartial standards for assessing digital tools for front-
line health workers, including data governance and 
ethics. Through a south to south collaboration of key 
stakeholders, we hope to extend these discussions to 
South Africa and stakeholders throughout the region 
with the broader aim of catalysing evidence based deci-
sion making as a part of strengthening the governance 
of scaling up of digital tools in the health sector.
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